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Abstract
We study the problem of non-interactive correlation distillation (NICD). Suppose that Alice and Bob each have a string, denoted
by A = a0a1 · · · an−1 and B = b0b1 · · · bn−1, respectively. Furthermore, for every k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, (ak , bk) is drawn
independently from a distributionN , known as the ‘noise model’. Alice and Bob wish to ‘distill’ the correlation non-interactively,
i.e., they wish to each apply a function to their strings, and output one random bit, denoted by X and Y , such that Pr[X = Y ] can
be made as close to 1 as possible. The problem is, for what noise models can they succeed? This problem is related to various
topics in computer science, including information reconciliation and random beacons. In fact, if NICD is indeed possible for some
general class of noise models, then some of these topics would, in some sense, become straightforward corollaries.
We prove two negative results on NICD for various noise models. We prove that, for these models, it is impossible to distill the
correlation to be arbitrarily close to 1. We also give an example where Alice and Bob can increase their correlation with one bit of
communication (in this case they need to each output two bits). This example, which may be of interest on its own, demonstrates
that even the smallest amount of communication is provably more powerful than no communication.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Non-interactive correlation distillation
Consider the following scenario. Let N be a distribution over Σ × Σ , where Σ is an alphabet. We call N a ‘noise
model’. Suppose that Alice and Bob each receive a string A = a0a1 · · · an−1 and B = b0b1 · · · bn−1, respectively, as
their local inputs. For every k = 0, 1 . . . , n − 1, (ak, bk) is drawn independently from N . Now Alice and Bob wish
to engage in a protocol to ‘distill’ their correlation. At the end of the protocol, they wish to each output a bit, denoted
by X and Y , respectively, such that both X and Y are ‘random enough’, while Pr[X = Y ] can be made as close to
1 as possible, possibly by increasing n. We call such a protocol a correlation distillation protocol. Furthermore, if
Alice and Bob wish to do so non-interactively, i.e., without communication, we call this ‘non-interactive correlation
distillation’ (NICD). Notice that, in NICD, the most general thing for Alice and Bob to do is to each apply a function
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to their local inputs and outputs one bit. The problem of NICD is, for what noise model can Alice and Bob achieve
this goal?
We note that NICD is indeed possible for some noise models. For example, if a noise modelN is in fact ‘noiseless’,
i.e., Pr(a,b)∈N [a = b] = 1, then NICD is possible. See Section 1.3 for more discussions. However, we are interested
in the ‘noisy’ noise models, for example the binary symmetric model, where Alice and Bob each have an unbiased
bit as input, which agree with probability 1 − p, and the binary erasure model, where Alice’s input is an unbiased
bit x and Bob’s input is x with probability 1 − p, and a special symbol ⊥ with probability p. These models are
studied extensively in the context of error-correcting codes [3,9], where Alice encodes her information before sending
it through a ‘noisy channel’. It is known that there exist efficient encoding schemes that withstand these noise models
and allowAlice and Bob to achieve almost perfect correlation. However, in the case of NICD, the ‘raw data’ are already
noisy. Can the techniques in error-correcting codes be used here, and is NICD possible for these noise models?
1.2. Motivations and related work
Besides the obvious relation to error-correcting codes, the study of NICD is naturally motivated by several other
topics. We review these topics and discuss some of the related work.
1.2.1. Information reconciliation
Information reconciliation is an extensively studied topic [4,6–8,15] with applications in quantum cryptography and
information-theoretical cryptography. In this setting, Alice and Bob each receives a sequence of random bits drawn
from a noise model, while Eve, the eavesdropper, also possesses some information about the bits. Alice and Bob wish
to ‘reconcile’ their information via an ‘information reconciliation protocol’, where they exchange information in a
noiseless, public channel in order to agree on a random string U with very high probability. Therefore, information
reconciliation protocols are somewhat like correlation distillation protocols. However, the primary concern for
information reconciliation is privacy, i.e., that Eve gains almost no information about U . Intuitively, since Eve can
see the conversation between Alice and Bob, maximum privacy would be achieved if information reconciliation can
be performed without communication.
1.2.2. Random beacons
A random beacon is an entity that broadcasts uncorrelated, unbiased random bits. The concept of random beacons
was first introduced in 1983 by Rabin [18], who showed how they can be used to solve various problems in
cryptography. From then on, random beacons have found many applications in security and cryptography [2,5,10,
11,14]. There are many proposals for constructing a publicly verifiable random beacon; among them are those that use
the signals from a cosmic source [16]. In these proposals, Alice (as the beacon owner) and Bob (as the verifier) both
point a telescope at an extraterrestrial object, e.g. a pulsar, and then measure the signals from it. Presumably these
signals contain a sufficient amount of randomness. Then Alice converts her measurement results into a sequence of
random bits, and publishes them as beacon bits. Bob can then verify the bits by performing his own measurement
and conversion. However, it is inevitable that there would be discrepancies in the results of Alice and Bob, due to
measurement errors (described by a noise model). These discrepancies may cause the beacon bits published by Alice
to disagree with those computed by Bob. One of the major concerns in the study on random beacons is to prevent
cheating in the presence of measurement error. In other words, one needs to design a mechanism to prevent Alice from
maliciously modifying her measurement data in order to affect the beacon bits, while pretending that the modification
comes from the measurement error. Notice that, in general, there is no communication between Alice and Bob. We
note that if NICD is possible, then the cheating problem would be solved, since NICD protocols can be used to distill
almost perfectly correlated bits. Then, with very high probability, the bits output by Alice and Bob should agree, and
this essentially removes the measurement error.
1.2.2.1. Related work. As we have discussed, the problem of NICD lies, in some sense, at the foundations of both the
studies of information reconciliation and random beacons. In fact, researchers from both areas have, to some extent,
considered the problem of NICD. In particular, a basic version of the problem concerning a very special type of NICD
protocol over the symmetric noise model was discovered and proven independently by several researchers since as
early as 1991, including Alon, Maurer,and Wigderson [1] and Mossel and O’Donnell [16]. They proved that NICD is
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impossible over the binary symmetric noise model, if the protocol is deterministic and must have completely unbiased
output (i.e., Pr[X = 0] = Pr[Y = 0] = 1/2). Mossel and O’Donnell studied the multi-party version of this problem,
where k > 2 parties wish to agree on some random bits. They are interested in whether the k parties can succeed with
a reasonable probability (inverse polynomial in k), rather than with high probability (close to 1), as in this paper. They
also only considered the binary symmetric noise model. In fact, we are not aware of any prior work that studies NICD
beyond the binary symmetric noise model.
We stress the importance of understanding the problem of NICD for general noise models. As we have mentioned,
this problem is important to the studies of both information reconciliation and random beacons. In both cases, there
is no reason to assume that the binary symmetric noise model is the only reasonable one. As an example, the
measurement of the signals from extraterrestrial objects is not unique, and different measurements may yield different
noise models. If one of these noise models admits NICD, then the problems of information reconciliation and random
beacon could, in some sense, be solved. Therefore, a better understanding of NICD over a more general class of noise
models would be very helpful. Furthermore, it is equally important to consider randomized protocols and ones that
output near-perfectly unbiased, instead of completely unbiased, bits.2 However, the previous results do not cover these
cases.
1.3. Our Contribution
We study NICD beyond the binary symmetric noise model. First, we prove an impossibility result for NICD over a
class of so-called ‘regular’ noise models in Section 3. Intuitively, a noise modelN is regular if it satisfies the following
three requirements: that it is symmetric, i.e., N (a, b) = N (b, a) for every a, b ∈ Σ ; that it is marginally uniform,
i.e., both the marginal distributions of the inputs of Alice and Bob are uniform; and that it is connected, i.e., Σ cannot
be partitioned into Σ0 and Σ1 such that N (a, b) = N (b, a) = 0 for all a ∈ Σ0 and b ∈ Σ1. Notice that if a noise
model is not connected, then NICD is indeed possible for such a model. Suppose that Σ is partitioned into Σ0 and Σ1.
If Alice and Bob interpret symbols in Σ0 as a ‘0’ and symbols in Σ1 as a ‘1’, then they essentially have a noiseless
binary noise model, which admits NICD.
In Section 4, we move over to the binary erasure noise model. It is the simplest noise model that is not symmetric,
and thus it is not regular. The binary erasure model is also a realistic one. Consider as an example the situation where
Alice and Bob receive their inputs by observing a pulsar. It is quite likely that the noise of the measurements by Alice
and Bob are of the ‘erasure-type’, i.e., the corruption of information can be detected. Furthermore, it is also possible
that Alice and Bob have different measurement apparatus and different levels of accuracy. In the random beacon
problem, Alice (as the beacon owner) might own a more sophisticated (and more expensive) measuring device with
higher accuracy, while Bob (as the verifier) has a more noisy measurement device. An extreme case would be that
Alice has perfect accuracy in her measurement, but Bob’s measurement is noisy. Such a situation can be described by
the binary erasure noise model. We prove that NICD is impossible for this noise model as well.
The impossibility results that we prove suggest that, for many noise models, communication is essential for
correlation distillation. Thus it is interesting to ask how much communication is essential and, in particular, if a
single bit of communication helps. In Section 5, we answer this question by presenting a protocol that non-trivially
distills correlation from the binary symmetric noise model with one bit of communication. Notice that to make the
problem interesting, Alice and Bob need to each output two bits. This result shows that even the minimal amount of
communication is provably more powerful than no communication at all. The protocol itself may also be of its own
interest.
2. Preliminaries and notations
We use [n] to denote the set {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. We often work with symbols from a particular alphabet, which is a
finite set of cardinality q and is normally denoted by Σ . We often identify Σ with [q].
All vectors are column vectors by default. A string is a sequence of symbols from an alphabet. We identify a
string with a vector and use them interchangeably. For a string x of length n, we use x[ j] to denote its j th entry, for
2 From a practical point of view, if, for a protocol P , both Pr[X = 0] and Pr[Y = 0] are -close to 1/2 for some small , then it is -close to a
perfectly unbiased protocol in terms of statistical distance.
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j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. We use 1n to denote the all-one vector (each of whose entries is 1) of dimension n. When the
dimension is clear from the context, it is often omitted.
We identify a function with its truth table, which is written as a vector. For example, we view a function over {0, 1}n
also as a 2n-dimensional vector. We assume a canonical ordering of n-bit strings.
We will work with tensor products. Let A and B both be vectors or both be matrices. We use A ⊗ B to denote the
tensor product of A and B, and A⊗n to denote the nth tensor power of A, which is the tensor product of n copies of A.
Definition 1 (Noise Model). A noise model over an alphabet Σ , often denoted by N , is a probabilistic distribution
over Σ × Σ . The nth tensor power of a noise model N is the distribution of a pair of length-n strings (A, B), where
A = a0a1 · · · an−1 and B = b0b1 · · · bn−1, and (ak, bk) is independently drawn from N for k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1.
In this paper we study randomized, non-interactive protocols.3
For the impossibility results in Sections 3 and 4, we assume that Alice and Bob each output a single bit, since it
suffices to prove a negative result on the ‘minimally useful’ protocols. We shall consider protocols that output multiple
bits in Section 5.
Since Alice and Bob do not communicate, the most general thing that they can do is to apply a (randomized)
function to their private inputs and output a bit. Therefore, we define a protocol as a pair of functions.
Definition 2 (Protocols). A protocol P over a noise model N is a family of function pairs (φAn , φBn ) for n > 0,
where φAn , φ
B
n : Σ n 7→ [−1, 1] are called the characteristic functions. The output of protocol P over noise model
N , denoted by P(N ), is a sequence of distributions {D1,D2, . . .}, where the nth distribution Dn is of the bit pair
(Xn, Yn), defined as follows.
(a, b)← N⊗n; x ← φAn (a), y ← φBn (b); Xn ← B(1+x)/2, Yn ← B(1+y)/2 : (Xn, Yn)
Bp is the Bernoulli Distribution of parameter p, defined as Bp(0) = 1− p and Bp(1) = p.
The intuition behind the definition is as follows. Since a protocol can be probabilistic, its output bit over any input can
be a (Bernoulli) probabilistic distribution. For different inputs, the Bernoulli distribution of the corresponding output
bit would be different. Thus we define the characteristic functions to describe the Bernoulli distributions.
Definition 3 (Statistical Distance). The statistical distance between two probabilistic distributions A and B, denoted
as SD(A, B), is defined to be SD(A, B) = 12
∑
x |A(x)− B(x)|, where the summation is taken over the support of A
and B. If SD(A, B) ≤ , we say A is -close to B.
Definition 4 (δ-Locally Uniform Protocols). A protocol P is δ-locally uniform over a noise model N , if for every
n > 0, both Xn and Yn are δ-close to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}, where (Xn, Yn) is the nth distribution of
P(N ). A protocol is locally uniform if it is 0-locally uniform.
Definition 5 (Correlation of Protocols). The correlation of a protocol P over a noise model N , denoted by
CorN [P], is defined to be
CorN [P] = lim infn {2 · Pr[Xn = Yn] − 1} (1)
where (Xn, Yn) is the nth distribution of P(N ).
3. An impossibility result for regular noise models
We prove a general impossibility result for NICD over the regular noise models.
3 We do not know if randomized protocols are strictly more powerful than deterministic ones, although we suspect that they are. As a case in
point, the ‘AND’ protocol in Section 5 is a randomized one, and we do not know any deterministic protocol that is locally uniform and has a
comparable correlation.
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Definition 6 (Distribution Matrix). LetN be a noise model over Σ , where |Σ | = q. We say a q × q matrix M is the
distribution matrix for N , if Mx,y = N (x, y) for all x, y ∈ Σ .4 We write the distribution matrix of N as MN .
Definition 7 (Regular Noise Model). A q×q matrix M is regular if it is symmetric, and 1q is the unique eigenvector
with the largest absolute eigenvalue. Let  be the difference between M’s largest absolute eigenvalue and the second
largest. We call q ·  the scaled eigenvalue gap of M . A noise model N is regular if its distribution matrix is regular.
The regular noise model may appear a little counter-intuitive, especially with respect to the intuition in Section 1.3.
We briefly explain the connection here. Notice that a distribution matrix M is non-negative (that every entry is non-
negative). By the Perron–Frobenius Theorem [13], if M is symmetric, irreducible (meaning that it is ‘connected’), and
has 1q as an eigenvector, then 1q is the unique eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue, and thus M is regular.
The following is a well-known result in matrix theory; for example, see [12]. We will use this lemma in our proof
of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Let A be an a× a matrix of eigenvectors v0, . . . , va−1, with corresponding eigenvalues λ0, . . . , λa−1. Let
B be a b×b matrix of eigenvectors u0, . . . , ub−1, with corresponding eigenvaluesµ0, . . . , µb−1. Then the eigenvalues
of the matrix A ⊗ B are vi ⊗ u j with corresponding eigenvalues λi · µ j , for i ∈ [a] and j ∈ [b].
Theorem 1. If N is a regular noise model over Σ with scaled eigenvalue gap , then the correlation of any δ-locally
uniform protocol over N is at most 1− (1− 4δ2).
Proof. Consider a protocol P over the noise model N . We define q = |Σ | and identify Σ with [q] for the rest of the
proof. We use M to denote the distribution matrix of N and denote the eigenvector of M by v0, v1, . . . , vq−1 with
corresponding eigenvalues λ0, . . . , λq−1. We assume that |λ0| > |λ1| ≥ · · · ≥ |λq−1|. Since M is regular, λ0 is the
unique largest eigenvalue that corresponds to eigenvector 1q .
Since M is the distribution matrix, we know that the sum of all its entries is 1. Thus we have
1 = 1Tq · M · 1q = λ0 · 1Tq · 1q = λ0 · q,
or λ0 = 1/q . Since the scaled eigenvalue gap of M is , we know that |λ1| = (1− )/q.
Consider the characteristic functions φAn and φ
B
n . It is easy to see that
Pr[Xn = 1] = 12 ·
[
1+
∑
a∈Σ n
∑
b∈Σ n
N⊗n(a, b) · φA(a)
]
. (2)
Clearly, M⊗n is the distribution matrix for N⊗n . We will be using a result about the eigenvalues and eigenvectors
of M⊗, stated in Lemma 1.
Since P is δ-locally uniform, we have
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
a∈Σ n
∑
b∈Σ n
N⊗n(a, b) · φA(a)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2δ (3)
or |(φA)T · M⊗n · 1qn | ≤ 2δ, as we identify φA with the qn-dimensional vector represented by its truth table. Since
1q is an eigenvector of M with eigenvalue 1/q , 1qn is an eigenvector of M⊗n with eigenvalue 1/qn (see Lemma 1).
Since M is symmetric, so is M⊗n . Thus we have
|1Tqn · φA| ≤ 2δ · qn . (4)
Similarly, we have
|1Tqn · φB | ≤ 2δ · qn . (5)
4 Here we identify Σ with [q].
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Now, we consider the correlation of P . Let (Xn, Yn) be the outputs of Alice and Bob. Then we have
2 · Pr[Xn = Yn] − 1 =
∑
A∈Σ n
∑
B∈Σ n
N⊗n(A, B) · φA(A) · φB(B). (6)
In other words, we have
2 · Pr[Xn = Yn] − 1 = (φA)T · M⊗n · φB . (7)
We diagonalize the matrix M⊗n . First we define a natural notion of inner product: 〈A, B〉 = 1qn
∑
x∈Σ n A[x]B[x]. It
is obvious that, under this inner product, both φAn and φ
B
n have norm at most 1. Since M
⊗n is symmetric, it has a set of
eigenvectors that form an orthonormal basis. We denote the eigenvectors of M⊗n by ut with corresponding eigenvalues
µt , where t ∈ [qn]. We assume that |µ0| ≥ |µ1| ≥ · · · ≥ |µqn−1|. By Lemma 1, the eigenvalues µt are of the form∏n
i=1 λki , where ki ∈ [q]. Therefore M⊗n has a unique maximum eigenvalue µ0 = λn0 = 1/qn , which corresponds to
the eigenvector 1⊗nq = 1qn . The second largest absolute eigenvalue of M⊗n is |µ1| = λn−10 · |λ1| = (1− )/qn .
Now we perform a Fourier analysis of vectors φA and φB . We write φA =∑t∈[qn ] αt ·ut and φB =∑t∈[qn ] βt ·ut .
Then, by Parseval, we have
∑
t α
2
t ≤ 1,
∑
t β
2
t ≤ 1. Furthermore, from (4) and (5), we have |α0| = 1qn |1Tqn · φA| ≤ 2δ
and |β0| = 1qn |1Tqn · φB | ≤ 2δ.
Putting things together, we have
CorN⊗n [P] = (φA)T · M⊗n · φB
= qn ·
∑
t∈[qn ]
αt · βt · µt
≤  · |α0β0| + (1− )
∑
t∈[qn ]
|αt · βt | (eigenvalue gap)
≤  · 4δ2 + (1− )
(∑
t
α2t
)(∑
t
β2t
)
(Cauchy–Schwartz)
≤ 1− (1− 4δ2).
The theorem is proved. 
Definition 8 (Binary Symmetric Noise Model). The binary symmetric noise model is a distribution over alphabet
{0, 1}, denoted by Sp and is defined as S(0, 0) = S(1, 1) = (1− p)/2 and S(0, 1) = S(1, 0) = p/2.
Corollary 1. The correlation of any locally uniform protocol over the binary symmetric noise model Sp is at most
1− 2p.
It is easy to see that this bound is tight, since the naı¨ve protocol where both Alice and Bob output their first bits is
locally uniform with correlation 1− 2p.
Proof. Notice that Sp is regular with scaled eigenvalue gap 2p. 
This corollary was discovered independently by various researchers, including Alon, Maurer, and Wigderson [1], and
Mossel and O’Donnell [16], and the latter attributing it as ‘folklore’.
4. The binary erasure noise model
We prove a similar impossibility result for another noise model, namely the binary erasure noise model. Intuitively,
this model describes the situation where Alice sends an unbiased bit to Bob, which is erased (and replaced by a
special symbol ⊥) with probability p. Notice that it is not a symmetric model and thus is not covered by the result in
the previous section.
Definition 9 (Binary Erasure Noise Model). The binary erasure noise model is a distribution over alphabet {0, 1,⊥},
denoted by Ep and defined as E(0, 0) = E(1, 1) = (1− p)/2, E(0,⊥) = E(1,⊥) = p/2.
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Notice that, in this model, Alice’s input is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}, and Bob’s input is 0 and 1 with
probability (1− p)/2 each, and ⊥ with probability p. A naı¨ve protocol under this model only uses the first pair of the
inputs. Alice outputs her bit, and Bob outputs his bit if his input is 0 or 1, and outputs a random bit if his input is ⊥.
This is a locally uniform protocol with correlation 1− p. The next theorem shows that no protocol can do much better
than the naı¨ve protocol.
Theorem 2. The correlation of any locally uniform protocol over the noise model Ep is at most
√
1− p(1− 4δ2).
Proof. We introduce more notations. A binary string is a string over alphabet {0, 1}. For a binary string x , we denote
its Hamming weight by |x |, which is the number of 1s in x . We call a vector v over alphabet {0, 1,⊥} an extended
bit vector, and define its degree, denoted by deg(v), to be the number of ⊥s in it. An error vector, denoted by u, is
a vector over alphabet {?,⊥}, and its degree is also the number of ⊥s in it. Taking a k-dimensional bit vector v and
an n-dimensional error vector u of degree (n − k), we define their composition to be an n-dimensional extended bit
vector x defined as
x[i] =
{
v[ j] if u[i] = ? and j = |{l : 0 ≤ l < i, u[l] = ?}|
⊥ if u[i] =⊥ (8)
and we write this as x = v F u. As an example, we have (1, 0, 1) F (⊥, ?, ?,⊥, ?) = (⊥, 1, 0,⊥, 1). Notice that every
extended bit vector x can be written uniquely as such a composition of a bit vector v and an error vector u. So we
denote v to be the extracted bit vector of x , and write it as v = [x]; we denote u to be the error vector of x and write
it as u = {x}.
For a bit vector x and an extended bit vector v, both of dimension n, we say that x is consistent with v if, for every
i such that v[i] 6=⊥, we have x[i] = v[i]. We denote this as x v v.
For a bit vector x and an error vector u of degree d , we define the restricted vector of x with respect to u to be the
unique (n − d)-dimensional bit vector v such that x v (v F u), and we write this as v = x |u . The excluded vector of
x with respect to u is the d-dimensional vector v′ defined to be v′[i] = x[k], where k = |{ j : 0 ≤ j < i, u[ j] = ?}|.
We also write x = v u_ v′, and say that x is joined by v and v′ with respect to u.
We now fix a protocolP and consider its characteristic functions φA and φB (we omit the subscript n). Both are real
functions over {0, 1,⊥}n . Since we are in the erasure model, the input to Alice never contains ⊥, so we can assume
that φA is a function over {0, 1}n . We perform Fourier analysis on φA, using parity functions as the orthonormal basis:
φA(x) =
∑
s
αs ⊕s (x) (9)
where we have
∑
s α
2
s ≤ 1. Since P is δ-locally uniform, we have
|α0| ≤ 2δ. (10)
The analysis for φB is more complicated. We decompose φB into 2n ‘sub-functions’, according to the 2n error
vectors. For error vector u, we define a function ψu that maps (n − k)-dimensional bit vectors to {−1,+1}, where k
is the degree of u. Then we perform a Fourier analysis for every sub-function, and write
ψu(x) =
∑
s
βu,s ⊕s (x). (11)
Again we have
∑
s β
2
u,s ≤ 1 for every error vector u.
We define λ = p/(1− p). Then it is easy to see that the probability that Bob receives an extended error vector of
degree d is λd · (1− p)n . Furthermore, it is easy to verify that
∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λdeg(u) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
λk = 1
(1− p)n . (12)
For the rest of the proof, we write λu as shorthand for λdeg(u).
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Finally, we estimate the correlation between the outputs. We denote this by η, and it is not hard to see that
η =
(
1− p
2
)n ∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λu
∑
x
φA(x)ψu(x |u). (13)
By substituting in the Fourier coefficients, we have
η =
(
1− p
2
)n ∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λu
∑
x
∑
s⊆{0,1}n
∑
t⊆{0,1}n−deg(u)
αsβt ⊕s (x)⊕t (x |u)
=
(
1− p
2
)n ∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λu
∑
s⊆{0,1}n
∑
t⊆{0,1}n−deg(u)
αsβt
(∑
x
⊕s(x)⊕t (x |u)
)
.
Now, we fix an error vector u of degree r , and fix sets s, t . We write s = s0 ∪ s1, such that for every i ∈ s0 we have
u[i] = ? and for every i ∈ s1 we have u[i] =⊥. We write this as s0 = s|u . If s1 = ∅, we say that s is consistent with
u, and we write this as s v u. Then we have∑
x∈{0,1}n
⊕s(x)⊕t (x |u) =
∑
v∈{0,1}n−d
∑
v′∈{0,1}d
⊕s0(v)⊕s1 (v′)⊕t (v)
=
∑
v∈{0,1}n−d
⊕s0⊕t (v)
∑
v′∈{0,1}d
⊕s1(v′).
So the only time we get non-zero as a result is when s0 = t and s1 = ∅, which means that s = t . Therefore, we
have
η = (1− p)n
∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λu
∑
svu
αsβu,s|u
≤ (1− p)n
( ∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λu
)1/2
·
 ∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λu
(∑
svu
αsβu,s|u
)21/2 (Cauchy–Schwartz)
= (1− p)n/2 ·
[ ∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λu ·
(∑
svu
α2s
)
·
(∑
svu
β2u,s|u
)]1/2
(Eq. (12))
≤ (1− p)n/2 ·
[ ∑
u∈{?,⊥}n
λu ·
(∑
svu
α2s
)]1/2
(Parseval,
∑
svu β2u,s|u ≤ 1 )
= (1− p)n/2 ·
[∑
s
α2s
∑
u:svu
λu
]1/2
= (1− p)n/2 ·
[∑
s
α2s · (1+ λ)n−|s|
]1/2
≤ (1− p)n/2
[
(1+ λ)n−1(1+ 4δ2(1+ λ))
]1/2
(Eq. (10))
=
√
1− p(1− 4δ2).
The theorem is proved. 
We suspect that the bound of Theorem 2 is not a tight bound (we conjecture that the tight bound should be 1− p), but
it is sufficient to show that it is bounded away from 1 and is independent of n. Therefore, even with perfect accuracy
in Alice’s measurement, NICD is impossible if Bob’s measurement is noisy.
We mention that it is possible to obtain an alternative proof of Theorem 2 by building on the results of
O’Donnell [17].
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5. A one-bit communication protocol
We present a protocol that non-trivially distills correlation over the binary symmetric noise model with one bit of
communication. Recall that no non-interactive, locally uniform protocol can have a correlation more than 1−2p. Now,
we consider protocols with one bit of communication. Suppose that Alice sends one bit to Bob, which Bob receives
with perfect accuracy. With one bit of communication, Alice can generate an unbiased bit x and send it to Bob, and
then Alice and Bob both output x . This protocol has perfect correlation. Thus, to make the problem non-trivial, we
require that Alice and Bob must output two bits each. Suppose that Alice outputs (X1, X2) and Bob outputs (Y1, Y2).
We define the correlation of a protocol to be 2 · mini=1,2 {Pr[X i = Yi ]} − 1. In this situation, we say a protocol is
locally uniform if both (X1, X2) and (Y1, Y2) are uniformly distributed.
Now we describe a locally uniform protocol of correlation about 1 − 3p/2. The protocol is called the ‘AND’
protocol. Both Alice and Bob only take the first two bits as their inputs. Alice directly outputs her bits, and sends
the AND of her bits to Bob. Then, intuitively, Bob ‘guesses’ Alice’s bits using the Bayes rule and outputs them.
A technical issue is that Bob has to ‘balance’ his output so that the protocol is still locally uniform. The detailed
description is in Fig. 1.
STEP I Alice computes r := a1 ∧ a2, sends r to Bob, and outputs (a1, a2).
STEP II Bob, upon receiving r from Alice:
IF r = 1 THEN output (1, 1).
ELSE IF b1 = b2 = 1 THEN output
. (0, 0) with probability p/(2− p);
. (0, 1) with probability (1− p)/(2− p);
. (1, 0) with probability (1− p)/(2− p);
ELSE output (b1, b2).
Fig. 1. The AND protocol: Alice receives input bits a1, a2 and Bob receives input bits b1, b2, where (a1a2, b1b2) is drawn from S⊗2p .
We can easily verify (by a straightforward computation) the following result.
Theorem 3. The AND protocol is a locally uniform protocol with correlation 1− 3p2 + p
2
4−2p . 
This is a constant-factor improvement over the non-interactive case.
This result may seem a little surprising. It appears that Alice does not fully utilize the one-bit communication, since
she sends an AND of two bits, whose entropy is less than 1. It is tempting to speculate that, by having Alice send the
XOR of the two bits, Alice and Bob can obtain a better result, since Bob gets more information. Nevertheless, the
XOR does not work, in some sense due to its ‘symmetry’. Here we provide some intuition. Consider the case where
Alice sends the XOR of her bits to Bob. Bob can compute the XOR of his bits, and if the two XORs agree, then
Bob knows that, with high probability, both of his bits agree with Alice’s. However, if the two XORs do not agree,
Bob knows that one of his bits is ‘corrupted’, but he has no information about which one. Furthermore, however Bob
guesses, he will be wrong with probability 1/2. On the other hand, in the AND protocol, if Bob receives a ‘1’ as
the AND of the bits from Alice, he knows for sure that Alice has (1, 1) and thus he simply outputs (1, 1); if r = 0
and b1 = b2 = 1, he knows that his input is ‘corrupted’, and he ‘guesses’ Alice’s bit according to the Bayes rule of
posterior probabilities. If Bob receives a ‘0’ as the AND and (b1, b2) 6= (1, 1), then the data looks ‘consistent’ and
Bob just outputs his bits. In this way, 1/4 of the time (when Bob receives a 1), Bob knows Alice’s bits for sure and
can achieve perfect correlation; otherwise Alice and Bob behave almost as in the non-interactive case, which gives
1− 2p correlation. So the overall correlation is about 1/4 · 1+ (3/4) · (1− 2p) = 1− 3p/2.
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